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OVERLAPPING COVERAGES IN LIABILITY CONTRACTS;
SUBROGATION
JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN*

The subjects here discussed are relatively simple; yet there is
no uniformity in the results except in certain broad areas. Rather
than dealing with specific citations of authority, it would then seem
better to discuss the places where conflict arises.
Within the last twenty-five years, approximately, a considerable
transition has taken place in approaching the coverages of automobile
policies. At one time, liability insurers used to require their policyholders to pledge that they did not carry other insurance of like
character. It is difficult to understand why this situation ever arose.
It may have been an outgrowth of fire coverages, or health and
accident provisions, in which a moral hazard actually might exist
where excessive protection is carried.
Thereafter, instead of making this a matter of warranty, policies
frequently provided that in the event there should be any other valid
or collectible insurance, the basic policy would be void. Let us
suppose that a man had two such policies, each of which had a like
provision of this character. Each then would attempt to disclaim
liability because of the existence of the other contract. As we are all
aware, not all of the insurance contract is written in the language of
the policy; much of it is written by the courts when confronted with
this situation. And, whefl confronted with this problem, their answer
was succinct: "Gentlemen, this is ridiculous. A man who pays for
two policies should not wind up with none. These provisions are
mutually repugnant; we will hold you both liable, and you may share
the risk." In the event one policy was for $20,000 and another for
$5,000, such companies would usually wind up dividing the risk
proportionately, the company having the larger risk bearing its fair
proportion of the loss.
Probably the major problem in policy construction in this area
which we have had in recent years has arisen through the overlapping
features of the omnibus clause and the drive-other-cars provisions.
An omnibus clause is simply the "definition of the insured" provision
in the policy which provides that the term "insured" shall include
the person named in the policy and any person operating the automobile with the permission of the named insured, other than certain
excluded persons or agencies. The "drive-other-cars" clause provides
* Member, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts and District of Columbia Bars;
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basic coverage for the insured and members of his family when any of
them drives a different automobile, provided it is not one owned or
regularly used by the insured or other members of the family.
It would be pleasant to give an absolute result which is always
reached by the courts. This cannot be done. But it would be safe
to say that in the overwhelming majority of those cases that have
been presented, it is held that the omnibus clause provides the primary coverage and that the drive-other-cars provision constitutes
secondary or excess coverage-the theory being, apparently, that the
insurance follows the car, so far as the primary coverage is concerned.
It is surprising, in view of the almost unanimous nature of the results, that many companies will still contest this matter and try to
insist that the other company share its burden. The writer has a
case pending where one insurance company is insisting that a declaratory judgment be sought requiring a second company to carry the
burden or to share it equally-even though it has been explained that
no obligation would arise upon the second company until the first
company has spent its policy proceeds.
There are differences in results where peculiar questions are presented, such as in California where a primary responsibility is held
to obtain and a pro rata sharing of the risk to result. And, again, cases
will arise where one company is definitely upon a risk while another
company is relieved entirely of its obligation. Let us assume, for
example, that one policy expires at midnight and the accident happened, or is believed to have happened, at 2:00 a.m. Perhaps the
actual time of the occurrence cannot be determined, such as if all
persons involved are killed and the wreckage is not discovered until
the following day. The actual result may depend upon whether the
collision happened before midnight or after midnight. That, then,
becomes a factual issue to be determined as any other factual issue.
Or, a situation may arise to prevent the effectiveness of one of the
possibly overlapping contracts. Let us consider, for a moment, the
omnibus clause. An exception is normally contained restricting the
omnibus clause from extending where the vehicle was in the care,
custody, or control of a garage or place of repair. In such event, the
policy would not lend its protection, and if a drive-other-cars proviso became applicable, it might then constitute primary coverage.
More likely, there may be a garage policy then available to spread its
cloak of protection over the risk. But, let us suppose an even more
involved situation where there is no direct insurance upon the automobile at all-but where there may be a drive-other-cars endorsement
plus a non-ownership policy issued to an employer. In such event,
the courts are prone to say that the coverage will follow the driver,
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since it cannot follow the car. The driver is closer to the hazard than
is the employer, so the driver's company will normally become the
primary carrier, and the non-ownership coverage will then constitute
excess protection.
In some situations, a primary carrier may refuse to come in and
to defend, either from ignorance of the law or plain stubbornness.
In that event, the excess carrier may determine that the case should
be settled, or that a large judgment might result. Usually in such a
situation it would have rights similar to that of the insured to whom
the insurance company refuses to discharge its obligation; it may then
come in, defend, or settle as it sees best, and if it acts with reasonable
judgment, seek a reimbursement from the carrier which is primarily
liable. One word of caution: the excess carrier must be certain both
in this relationship, as well as in subrogation matters which we will
discuss subsequently, that it not place itself in the position of acting
as a volunteer. A volunteer may not recover the money it has expended, but if it is paying under a legal right or under a legal threat,
that is normally sufficient to induce a reasonable man, or even a
reasonable company, to act.
The doctrine of subrogation is equitable in origin with the result
that a right of subrogation normally would exist even if the insurance .contracts did not expressly so provide. But insurance policies
generally do provide that if the insurer makes payment under the
colision or comprehensive provisions of the policy, it has a right to
recover such damages from the wrongdoer responsible therefor. The
purpose of the doctrine is to place the loss ultimately upon the one
actually responsible for the occurrence. Our system of litigation in the
United States is based, fundamentally, upon the fault doctrine-and
it is just, under that doctrine, that the innocent be indemnified by the
blameworthy.
Subrogation claims are not limited to suits against the driver of
a vehicle. Under different forms of insurance contracts, they cover
many facets of different situations. For example, a bonding company
may have an obligation, either because of a default in the act of a
public official, or a public contract, where a cause of action may
arise under the doctrine of subrogation. Subrogation may arise
against the manufacturer of a product under a breach of warranty
situation. In Illinois, actions have been permitted by way of subrogation to an automobile insurance company against the operators
and owners of a dramshop under the Illinois dramshop statute.' That
law provides briefly that if any person is sold or given alcoholic
liquors and becomes intoxicated, then any person who is injured or
1. Dworak v. Tempel, 17 Ill. 2d 181, 161 N.E.2d 258 (1959).
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his dependents may recover the injuries sustained, up to a certain
limit, against the licensee or owners.2
Closely related to the doctrine of subrogation is the doctrine of
indemnification. However, a true indemnification situation carries
with it certain other problems. A true indemnification situation
ordinarily involves a person who is technically liable under the law,
without actually being personally at fault-or if at fault, to a lesser
degree than the true wrongdoer. For example, a master may have
to pay a third person injured by his servant because of the operation
of the doctrine of respondeat superior,but may recoup such damages
from his servants. A railroad employee may be knocked off the top
of the freight train by the projecting arm of an illegally constructed
loading platform, and the railroad be permitted to recover from the
one who erected such obstruction. A hotel has been permitted to
recover against a contractor doing work upon its premises, where
such contractor permitted a dangerous situation to remain which
caused injury to a patron of the hotel. It is considered just and equitable that the one primarily responsible reimburse the one secondarily
responsible under the law.
Turning back to the matter of a volunteer, interesting cases have
arisen where a company had no duty to pay. In that situation, the
courts have been prone to say that if the company paid without a
legal duty to do so, it acted as a volunteer and had no standing to
enforce a subrogation action. An attorney advising a company in
such a situation should be certain that its duty is clearly denoted, in
order to prevent difficulties in future cases.
Twenty years or more ago, there was considerable litigation as to
the person who might maintain a subrogation suit. In many states,
that still is a troublesome matter. Ordinarily, the insurer does not
want to be named as a party plaintiff but desires to use the name of
its insured. If the insured retains any property interest at all, by
reason of the deductible feature of the policy, the rule is ordinarily
that he may sue for the entire amount in his own name, even though
that state may have a "real party in interest" statute. In other states,
the action may be brought in the name of the insured "for the use
of" the insurance carrier. In very few jurisdictions, any more, is the
artifice of a "loan receipt" still employed.
Problems have arisen where the wrongdoer's carrier pays the injured insured a few dollars for a release of his personal injuries and
the deductible portion of his policy. In some such instances, a
general release is occasionally taken. If that company is aware of the
existence of the subrogation rights (and usually its inclusion of the
2. Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 43, § 135 (1955).
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deductible feature would demonstrate this), the release is not binding
to destroy the subrogation rights of the insured's carrier. The insurer
of the wrongdoer is estopped to set up such a defense, as it would be
tantamount to a fraud. And if such insured should effectively destroy
the subrogation rights of his carrier, his company would have a right
to recover back from him any payment which it had formerly made
to him or on his behalf.
The most interesting development in the subrogation field has been
the split cause of action. In many states, two suits will lie separatelyone for personal injury and one for property damage. Suppose, then,
the insurance carrier pays out three hundred dollars and sues in a
subrogation claim in a magistrate's court, but loses, and fails to
prosecute an appeal. In the absence of statute, such a result might
constitute an estoppel by judgment, which necessarily involves the
determination of issues of negligence or contributory negligence, and
may prevent a later prosecution of a suit by the insured for his own
personal injuries. There have been several decisions to the effect that
a settlement by one's insurer with another cannot be introduced in
evidence against the insured in enforcing his personal cause of action,
since he cannot control the action of the company-but here there is a
different situation where a judgment has actually been rendered
conclusive of certain issues. In Illinois, to avoid this result, the statute
was changed two years ago to provide that either the company or the
insured might maintain an action and that the result of neither suit
would bar nor impair the right of the other. Absent such statute, if
the insured could demonstrate that the company handled its litigation
negligently and by its negligent action destroyed his valid suit, it is
quite possible that he might be able to recover damages based upon
the value of his suit.
There are no absolutes in these fields. The results vary widely from
one jurisdiction to another. But it is apparent that in the consideration of most of these problems, the results in general conform to common sense.

